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GOODRIDGE V. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH: THE
WRONG STEP AT THE WRONG TIME FOR SAME-SEX
MARRIAGES
INTRODUCTION
Over the last ten years, states across the country have questioned the
constitutionality of excluding same-sex partners from the benefits of civil
marriage available to opposite-sex couples.' Most recently, Massachu-
setts answered the constitutionality debate by deciding that the Massa-
chusetts Constitution protects same-sex couples' right to marry. 2  The
core issues surrounding Goodridge v. Department of Public Health3 in-
clude: 1) whether same-sex marriage is a constitutionally protected right
making the regulation thereof subject to judicial scrutiny; and 2) whether
laws excluding same-sex couples from access to marriage licenses dis-
criminates solely on a suspect classification, such as sex, in violation of
due process and equality provisions of state constitutions.4
This Comment addresses the wisdom of electing to pursue legitimi-
zation of same-sex marriage through judicial action instead of through
the legislative process. Specifically, by pursuing legal recognition of
same-sex marriages in the courtroom, gay-rights groups have opened the
door to a backlash of constitutional amendments. As a result, these
amendments could preclude long-term legal equality for same-sex com-
mitted relationships in the United States.
Part I of this Comment reviews the facts of Goodridge. Part II dis-
cusses similar cases from other states that preceded Massachusetts's
landmark decision. Part Ill analyzes the majority and dissenting opin-
ions in Goodridge. Finally, Part IV catalogues the public opinion and
legislative actions generated by the decision.
1. See generally Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743,
at *6 (Alaska Feb. 27, 1998) (concluding marriage statute violated right to privacy provision in
Alaska Constitution; superseded by constitutional amendment, art. I, § 25 of the Constitution of
Alaska); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 68 (Haw. 1993) (concluding marriage statute implicated
Hawaii Constitution's equal protection clause; remanded case to lower court for further proceed-
ings); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999) (concluding marriage statute violated Vermont
Constitution's common benefits clause; resolved by creation of a civil union system); but see Stand-
hardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451, 453 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (holding marriage statute does not
violate liberty interests under either Federal or Arizona Constitution).
2. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941,948 (Mass. 2003).
3. Goodridge, 798 N.E. 2d at 941.
4. Id. at 953.
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I. FACTS OF GOODRIDGE V. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH5
On April 11, 2001, seven same-sex couples in Massachusetts filed
suit in the Superior Court against the Department of Public Health and
the Commissioner of Public Health for wrongfully denying them mar-
riage licenses.6 Procurement of a valid state-issued marriage license is a
prerequisite to civil marriage in Massachusetts. The plaintiffs argued
that by denying these couples marriage licenses, the Department of Pub-
lic Health deprived same-sex couples in the state from the obligations,
benefits, and protections of civil marriage.8 The defendants admitted to
the practice of denying marriage licenses to same-sex couples in Massa-
chusetts, but denied that this violated any law.9
The plaintiffs and defendants filed cross-motions for summary
judgment. 10 On May 7, 2002, the superior court judge entered judgment
for the defendants. The judge reasoned that the statutory language was
plainly inconsistent with the interpretation that a union between persons
of the same sex could fall under the definition of marriage. 12 In addition,
the superior court judge dismissed claims that denial of marriage licenses
to these same-sex couples violated constitutional rights.13 The court con-
cluded that the Massachusetts Constitution does not guarantee a funda-
mental right to marry a person of the same sex. 14 Moreover, the ban on
same-sex marriage did not "offend the liberty, freedom, equality, or due
process provisions of the Massachusetts Constitution."'' 5 Furthermore,
even if denying marriage licenses to same-sex couples violates their con-
stitutional rights, the court opined that the legislature could limit certain
rights if doing so rationally furthered a legitimate interest.'
6
The plaintiffs appealed the superior court's decision to grant sum-
mary judgment in favor of the defendants. 17 The Massachusetts Supreme
Court vacated the summary judgment for defendants and remanded the
case to the superior court to enter judgment for the plaintiffs. 18 However,
the Supreme Court stayed its judgment for 180 days to allow the legisla-
ture time to take any appropriate action based on the decision. 19
5. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
6. Goodridge, 798 N.E. 2d at 949-50.
7. Id. at 950.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 950-51.








18. Id. at 969-70.
19. Id. at 970.
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II. BACKGROUND
Historically, the definition of marriage is the union of one man and
one woman. 20 The concept of civil marriage in the United States is de-
rived from English common law.21 Colonists adopted the English con-
cept of marriage to regulate the procreation and care of children.22
A. Overview of Massachusetts Marriage Laws and Benefits
In Massachusetts, General Laws c. 207 (hereinafter "G.L. c. 207")
is the marriage licensing statute.23 The marriage licensing statute keeps
close relatives, persons with syphilis, persons who are already married,
24and in some cases minors from obtaining a license for civil marriage.
The statute also delineates the procedures for making the civil marriage a
matter of public record.25
The Massachusetts Constitution guarantees equality under the law
and protects due process and liberty for all persons.26 Although civil
marriage is statutorily created, arguably it is a part of the constitutionally
protected rights to equality and liberty. 27 In fact, the Massachusetts Con-
stitution protects an individual's liberty from government intrusion into
private matters to a greater extent than the Federal Constitution. 28  The
promulgation of these laws affords married couples an exhaustive list of
benefits.
Civil marriage offers many benefits in the Commonwealth of Mas-
sachusetts that domestic partnerships do not receive.29 In civil marriages,
courts and lawmakers have established predictable rules that govern sta-
bility and private responsibility for the care of children. 30 Additionally,
married couples enjoy certain unique property rights. 31 For example,
when a person dies intestate,32 the surviving spouse will automatically
inherit the deceased's property. 33 In wrongful death actions, surviving
spouses, unlike unmarried domestic partners, may sue for loss of consor-
20. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941,952 (Mass. 2003).
21. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 969.
22. See id. at 961.
23. Id. at 951.
24. Id. at 951-52.
25. Id. (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 207, § 20 (1998); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 207, § 28
(1998); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 207, § 40 (1998); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 17, § 4 (1998)).
26. See id. at 959-60.
27. See id. at 957.
28. Id. at 959 (citing Planned Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 677 N.E.2d
101 (Mass. 1997); Coming Glass Works v. Ann & Hope, Inc., 294 N.E.2d (Mass. 1973)).
29. Id. at 955 (citing Wilcox v. Trautz, 693 N.E.2d 141 (1998)).
30. Id. at 956.
31. See id. at 955.
32. Intestate is defined in pertinent part as: "Of or relating to a person who has died without a
valid will." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 840 (8th ed, 2004).
33. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 955 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190, § 1 (2004)).
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tium. 34 Also, certain life insurance policies and social security benefits
are only available to those who are or were married.35 The right to
marry, and thereby gain access to this myriad of benefits, is considered a
"civil right., 36
B. Marriage as a "Civil Right"
With technological innovations in the area of fertility, rising divorce
rates, and changes in adoption policies, the concepts of marriage and
family in the United States have changed over the last four decades.
37
Since the late 1960s, there has been a series of cases across the United
States that classify marriage as a "civil right."38
1. Perez v. Sharp
39
In 1948, the Supreme Court of California decided Perez v. Sharp.
n°
In Perez, a mixed-race couple challenged a California law making it ille-
gal for whites and blacks to marry.41 The court ruled that the legislature
may only interfere with the right to marry if there is "an important social
objective [of public health, safety, and welfare]," and by "reasonable
means." 42 The court reasoned that it is a violation of due process and
equal protection to deny access to the fundamental right to marry based
solely on "prejudice" and "oppressive discrimination. 4 3 In addition, the
court ruled that part of the fundamental right to marry is the right to
choose whom to marry. 4 Therefore, the court concluded that the statute
was impermissible because it restricted the right of people to choose to
marry somebody of a different race.45
2. Loving v. Virginia
46
Cases challenging the constitutionality of denying same-sex couples
the right to marry often rely on the reasoning in the 1967 Supreme Court
34. Id. at 956 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 229, § 2 (2000)).
35. Id. at 955.
36. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 541 (1942)); see also Milford v. Worcester, 7 Mass. 48, 56 (1810).
37. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d at 961.
38. See, e.g., Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (quoting Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541); see also Milford, 7
Mass. at 56.
39. 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948).
40. Perez, 198 P.2d at 17.
41. Id. at 17-18.




46. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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decision Loving v. Virginia.47 Like Perez, Loving addressed the constitu-
tionality of a law prohibiting interracial marriage 48 The Supreme Court
held that Virginia's anti-miscegenation statutes violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and, thus, were constitutionally
impermissible.49 Specifically, classifications in statutes cannot be "an
arbitrary and invidious discrimination." 50 Statutes that classify by race
are particularly scrutinized because the category is considered automati-
cally suspect.5  These types of classifications are only permissible if
they accomplish some state objective that is independent from racism.
52
The logic behind the Loving ruling fits nicely into same-sex marriage
cases because denial of marriage licenses to same-sex couples is based
on the gender of the potential spouse. Like race, gender is an automati-
cally suspect classification. 3
3. Lawrence v. Texas
54
Advocates of same-sex marriage may have regarded the recent Su-
preme Court decision in Lawrence v. Texas55 as evidence that the United
States was ready for a case like Goodridge. In Lawrence, the Supreme
Court held that a Texas sodomy statute, making it a crime for consenting
adults of the same sex to engage in certain sexual conduct in private, was
unconstitutional.56 Lawrence overruled a prior Supreme Court decision,
Bowers v. Hardwick,57 which had held that such a statute did not violate
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.58
The Lawrence Court claimed that the liberty issue before the Court
was not merely "the right to engage in certain sexual conduct," as
claimed in Bowers, but rather the liberty allowing homosexual persons
the right to "choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their
homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free
persons."59 The Texas statute subjected consenting adult homosexuals to
criminal charges for private sexual conduct.60 According to the Court,
despite the misdemeanor nature of the crime, homosexuals convicted
under the statute would have to report a criminal record on job and hous-
47. Loving, 388 U.S. at 1; see also Baehr v. Lewin 852 P.2d 44, 63 (Haw. 1993) (concluding
marriage statute implicated Hawaii Constitution's equal protection clause); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d
at 957.
48. Loving, 388 U.S. at 3-4.
49. Id. at 12.
50. Id. at 10.
51. Id. at 11.
52. Id.
53. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961 n.21.
54. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
55. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558.
56. See id. at 578-79.
57. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558.
58. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
59. Id. at 567 (discussing framing of the issues in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
60. id. at 562-63.
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ing applications. 61 Additionally, in certain states, homosexuals convicted
of sodomy would have to register as sex offenders.62
The Lawrence Court reviewed the history of sodomy statutes in the
United States that revealed a trend toward abolishing same-sex prohibi-
tions in sodomy laws. 63 Also, the Court claimed that there was wide-
spread disapproval of the Bowers decision. 64
The Court found no permissible rational basis for Texas to convict
consenting adults acting in private under this sodomy law.65 While the
Court acknowledged that there is a deep-rooted belief in America that
homosexual relationships are morally wrong, it concluded that it is not
for the majority to impose their personal moral convictions on individu-
als.66 The Court confirmed that "our laws and tradition afford constitu-
tional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education." 67 Thus,
in the matter of engaging in private consensual homosexual acts, the
government has no right to interfere with the personal liberty of same-
sex couples.68 Although the Court used some language aimed at limiting
the holding of Lawrence to same-sex sexual conduct,69 the Court's rea-
soning could be extended to argue that same-sex marriage prohibitions
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.7°
C. Same-Sex Marriage Cases Across the Nation
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court was not the first state
supreme court to encounter the constitutionality of denying access to
civil marriage to same-sex couples. In the last decade, Hawaii, Alaska
and Vermont all decided similar cases.7 1 Each case concluded that it was
impermissible under the respective state constitutions to deny state con-
61. Id. at 575-76.
62. Id. at 575.
63. Id. at 572-73.
64. Id. at 576.
65. Id. at 578.
66. Id. at 571.
67. Id. at 574 (citing Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
68. Id. at 578.
69. See, e.g., id. at 567:
The statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to
formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without being
punished as criminals... [t]his, as a general rule, should counsel against attempts by the
State, or a court, to define the meaning of the relationship or to set its boundaries absent
injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law protects.
Id.
70. Id. at 599-600 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
71. See Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CL, 1998 WL 88743 at *6
(Alaska Feb. 27, 1998) (concluding marriage statute violated right to privacy provision in Alaska
Constitution; superseded by constitutional amendment, art. 1, § 25 of the Constitution of Alaska);
Baehr, 852 P.2d at 55; Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999) (resolved by creation of civil
union system).
[Vol. 82:1
THE WRONG STEP AT THE WRONG TIME
ferred marital benefits to same-sex couples. 72 Yet, inevitably, the legisla-
ture in each state responded to the court's opinions by enacting legisla-
tion to expressly deny same-sex civil marriage.
1. Hawaii: Baehr v. Lewin
73
Hawaii took the first steps toward judicially recognizing same-sex
marriages in the United States.74 In Baehr v. Lewin,7 the plurality of the
Hawaii Supreme Court reasoned that a state law excluding same-sex
couples from obtaining marriage licenses may violate the Equal Protec-
tion Clause and Equal Rights Amendment of Hawaii's constitution.76
The court stated that allowing opposite-sex couples access to marriage
licenses, while denying marriage licenses to same-sex couples, consti-
tuted sex discrimination.77 In looking at United States Supreme Court
decisions that addressed the right to marriage, the court concluded that
while there is a constitutional right to marriage, same-sex marriage is not
a fundamental right. Specifically, the court opined that same-sex mar-
riage was not covered by the right to privacy nor deeply "rooted in tradi-
tions.,,78 Accordingly, the court overruled the trial court's judgment on
the pleadings in favor of the defendant Health Department and remanded
the case on the theory that denying same-sex couples access to marriage
licenses might constitute a discrimination based on gender.79 Moreover,
the court requested an evidentiary hearing to decide if the statute in ques-
tion "further[ed] compelling state interests" and was "narrowly drawn to
avoid unnecessary abridgments of constitutional rights." 80 On remand,
the trial court determined that the statute violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Hawaii Constitution and required the Health Department to
issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples.81
72. See, e.g., Brause, 1998 WL 88743 at *6 (concluding marriage statute violated right to
privacy provision in Alaska Constitution; superseded by constitutional amendment, art. I, § 25 of the
Constitution of Alaska); Baehr, 852 P.2d at 55 (concluding marriage statute implicated Hawaii
Constitution's equal protection clause; remanded case to lower court for further proceedings); Baker,
744 A.2d at 886.
73. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (concluding marriage statute implicated Hawaii Constitution's
equal protection clause; remanded case to lower court for further proceedings).
74. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 68 (concluding marriage statute implicated Hawaii Constitution's
equal protection clause; remanded case to lower court for further proceedings).
75. 852 P.2d 44 (concluding marriage statute implicated Hawaii Constitution's equal protec-
tion clause; remanded case to lower court for further proceedings).
76. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 55 (concluding marriage statute implicated Hawaii Constitution's
equal protection clause; remanded case to lower court for further proceedings).
77. Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage,
1996 BYU L. REv. 1, 11 (1996).
78. Id. at 13.
79. Id. at 13-14.
80. Id. at 15.
81. Baehr v. Miike, CIV. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 at *22 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996)
(superseded by HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23).
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In response to Baehr, the Hawaii legislature amended the Hawaii
Constitution in 1998 to reserve marriage for opposite-sex couples.
82
However, in exchange, the legislature agreed to provide a benefits pack-
age for couples who were not married, including same-sex couples.83
The same year that the Hawaii legislature amended Hawaii's constitution
to exclude same-sex couples from the definition of marriage, the Su-
preme Court of Alaska decided a case similar to Baehr.
2. Alaska: Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics
84
In 1998, Alaska became the second state to address the constitution-
ality of statutes banning same-sex marriage.85 The court in Brause v.
Bureau of Vital Statistics86 held that the Alaska marriage code limiting
civil marriage to unions between one man and one woman violated the
right to privacy and equal protection provisions of Alaska's constitu-
tion.87 The court equated the right to privacy with the right to be free
from government intrusion into "intimate personal decisions of the indi-
vidual. 88  Accordingly, because the Alaska marriage code interfered
with the "intimate personal decision" of whom to marry, the court deter-
mined that the code violated an individual's right to privacy. 89 The court
further reasoned that to ensure equal protection of fundamental rights, a
state statute that discriminated based on sex should be subjected to the
highest level of scrutiny. 90 Therefore, the court ruled that the parties
needed to engage in further hearings to determine whether the state had a
compelling interest in denying same-sex partners the fundamental right
to marry. 9 1
Although the court recognized the discrepancies between the rights
of same-sex couples and those of opposite sex couples, subsequent legis-
lation silenced this opinion. Like Baehr, an amendment to the Alaska
constitution superseded the Brause decision.92 Once again the legislature
recognized marriage as "exist[ing] only between one man and one
woman."
93
82. HAW. CONST. art. L § 23.
83. David Orgon Coolidge, The Hawai'i Marriage Amendment: It's Origins, Meaning and
Fate, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 19, 116 (2000).
84. No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743 at *6 (Alaska Feb. 27, 1998) (concluding marriage
statute violated right to privacy provision in Alaska Constitution; superseded by constitutional
amendment, art. I, § 25 of the Constitution of Alaska).
85. Brause, 1998 WL 88743 at *3-*4, *6.
86. Id.
87. Id. at *1.
88. Id. at *6.
89. Id. at *5.
90. Id. at *6.
91. Id.
92. ALASKA CONST. art. L § 25.
93. Id.
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3. Vermont: Baker v. State94
One year later, the Vermont Supreme Court ruled that denying
same-sex couples access to marriage licenses was impermissible under
the state's constitution.95 Unlike Hawaii, Alaska, and Massachusetts,
Vermont's constitution includes a Common Benefits Clause distinct from
equal protection. 96 The core of the Common Benefits Clause is the in-
clusion of all political groups.97 Specifically, no one person or group can
receive special benefits and advantages from the government that are not
available to other groups.98 The court concluded that because marriage
came with certain unique benefits, the state could not arbitrarily exclude
a group of persons from these state-conferred benefits.
99
After Baker, the Vermont legislature had the choice to either in-
clude same-sex couples under the existing marriage laws or create a par-
allel statutory relationship to ensure equal benefits to same-sex cou-
ples. 1° ° Not surprisingly, the state legislature responded by codifying a
system of civil unions that give all of the state benefits of marriage to
same-sex committed partnerships without conferring on them the status
of civil marriage.
101
The federal government immediately reacted to the success of
same-sex marriage cases. In 1996, following Baehr, Congress approved
a bill to allow states to not recognize same-sex marriages performed in
other states. 10 2 Additionally, the Defense of Marriage Act sought to de-
fine federally marriage as a union between one man and one woman.10 3
On September 21, 1996, President Clinton signed the bill into law.1°4
The federal government, faced with the possibility of same-sex marriage
gaining recognition in certain states, enacted legislation on civil mar-
riage, a subject traditionally left to the states to regulate.
94. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
95. Baker, 744 A. 2d at 886.
96. See VT. CONST. art. VII, ch. 1:
That government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection, and se-
curity of the people, nation, or community, and not for the particular emolument or ad-
vantage of any single person, family, or set of persons, who are a part only of that com-
munity; and that the community hath an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right,
to reform or alter government, in such manner as shall be, by that community, judged
most conducive to the public weal.
Id.
97. Baker, at 874-75.
98. VT. CONST. art. VII, ch. 1; see also Baker, 744 A.2d at 867.
99. Baker, 744 A.2d at 886.
100. Id. at 869.
101. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204 (2003).
102. Charles Bierbauer, Anti Gay Marriage Act Clears Congress, CNN.com, (Sept. 10, 1996),
at http://www.cnn.com/us/9609/1Ogay.marriage.
103. Louise Schiarone, Amendments Tie Up Anti Gay-Marriage Bill, CNN.com, (Sept. 5,
1996), at http://www.cnn.comlus/9609/05/gay.marriages/index.htmt.
104. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996); see also Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, H.R. 3396, 104th Cong. §
2-3 (1996).
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In summary, the fate of past court decisions from other states on the
same-sex marriage issue were indicators that: 1) public opinion did not
support same-sex marriage; and 2) if a court ruling threatened to force a
state to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples contrary to public
opinion, legislatures would act on behalf of constituents to prevent it.
Despite this backdrop, seven same-sex couples brought a case similar to
Baehr, Brause, and Baker in Massachusetts.
III. GOODRIDGE V. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH'
°5
Notwithstanding the failure of the previous state cases to enact
longstanding change, seven same-sex couples in Massachusetts turned to
the judicial system to grant them access to civil marriage. In Goodridge
v. Department of Public Health, °6 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts found that: 1) same-sex couples were statutorily denied marriage
licenses; and 2) this denial violated the Massachusetts Constitution." 7
First, the court dissected the literal and textual meaning behind the
Massachusetts marriage license statute, G.L. c. 207, and concluded that it
excluded same-sex couples from obtaining marriage licenses.108 Next,
the court analyzed whether G.L. c. 207 violated the state constitution's
due process and equal protection provisions. 109 Using a rational basis
standard of review, the majority concluded that the marriage license stat-
ute violated the state constitution. 10 Alternatively, the concurring justice
felt that the court did not need to consider due process and equal protec-
tion arguments because the statute impermissibly discriminated on the
basis of sex in violation of Article I of the Declaration of Rights as
amended by Article 106 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts
Constitution."' Finally, the dissenting justices disagreed that the
marriage license statute violated the state constitution.
A. Majority Opinion: Rejecting the Defendants' Rational Basis Argu-
ments to Find G.L. c. 207 Violated the State Constitution
The defendants first claimed that G.L. c. 207 was rational because it
promoted procreation. 12 Although the procreation of future generations
was of great importance in early American history, the majority reasoned
that fertility was no longer the core purpose of marriage.' The majority
105. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
106. Goodridge, 798 N.E. 2d at 941.
107. Id. at 953, 963.
108. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 207, § 1 (Law. Co-op. 2004); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 951,
953.
109. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 960-61, 963.
110. Id. at 960-61.
111. Id. at 970 (Greaney, J., concurring).
112. Id. at 961.
113. Id.
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based their assessment on the facts that: 1) not all married couples can or
do have children;'1 4 2) marriage is not a prerequisite to bearing children;
and 3) lack of fertility is not a valid ground for dissolving a marriage.1 15
Thus, the majority disagreed with the defendants' procreation rationale
by noting that procreation is not the central defining goal of the institu-
tion.' 1
6
The majority also discarded the defendants' second claim that the
statute was permissible because it guaranteed the "optimal" setting for
child rearing." 7 The majority found this claim baseless. The fact that
same-sex couples could already legally adopt children in the state un-
dermined this argument." 18 In addition, the majority reasoned there was
a lack of sufficient research to prove definitively that a household with
parents of the opposite-sex was the best setting for child rearing. 119 The
majority further suggested that the classification of same-sex couples as a
less desirable child-rearing unit may have, in part, been based on the fact
that same-sex couples were denied the benefits of civil marriage in the
first place. 120 Therefore, the defendants failed to convince the court that
the marriage license statute furthered a legitimate government interest in
the welfare of children.
Finally, the majority rejected the defendants' third argument that the
statute was rationally permissible because it safeguarded state and pri-
vate resources.12' The majority reasoned that many of the Goodridge
same-sex couples had dependants who needed the same state protections
afforded to dependants of opposite-sex couples. 122 Also, the majority
explained that the decision to provide married couples with certain bene-
fits was not based on a demonstration of financial dependence of one
partner. 123 Thus, the majority reasoned that even if same-sex couples
were financially less dependant on one another, their independent finan-
cial stability was not a reason to deny them the benefits of civil mar-
riage. 124
In conclusion, the defendants failed to provide a rational basis for
the legislature to deny same-sex couples access to civil marriage. As a
result, the majority found that the marriage license statute was impermis-




117. Id. at 961, 963.
118. Id. at 962.
119. Id. at 962-63.
120. Id. at 963.
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B. Justice Greaney's Concurring Opinion: G.L. c. 207 Impermissibly
Discriminates Based on Gender
In his concurrence, Justice Greaney opined that the court could re-
solve the issue based on constitutionally impermissible sex discrimina-
tion alone.1 26 Justice Greaney asserted that the court need not look be-
yond Article I of the Declaration of Rights as amended by Article 106 of
the amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution, which prohibits dis-
crimination based on "sex, race, color, creed, or national 
origin.'' 127
Simply put, Justice Greaney reasoned that because the right to marry was
part of a fundamental right to enjoy life and that discriminating against
same-sex couples was a discrimination based on the sex of the marital
partner, the marriage licensing statute was unconstitutional.' 28
Justice Greaney further stated that the court was not limited to the
traditional definition of marriage as being between one man and one
woman. 129 Specifically, he suggested that the court should scrutinize the
validity of that definition in light of Article 1.130 According to Justice
Greaney, "neither the mantra of tradition, nor individual conviction, can
justify the perpetuation of a hierarchy in which couples of the same sex
and their families are deemed less worthy of social and legal recognition
than couples of the opposite sex and their families."
131 In fact, Justice
Greaney likely would have included same-sex committed couples in the
definition of marriage despite the literal and textual meanings of mar-
riage derived by the majority.
C. Justice Spina 's, Justice Sosman 's, and Justice Cordy's Dissents: The
Court Misapplied the Rational Basis Standard and, thus, Usurped
Legislative Power
Justices Spina, Sosman, and Cordy dissented. 132 The dissenting jus-
tices in Goodridge did not agree that the Massachusetts marriage statute
violated the state constitution. Justice Spina expressed concern with: 1)
the court usurping legislative power; 33 2) the court misconstruing the sex
discrimination element of the equal protection argument; 1
34 3) the char-
126. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 971 (Greaney, J., concurring).
127. Id. at 970 (citing MASS. CoNsT. art 1 (2004), amended by MASS. CONST. art. CVL Art. 1).
All people are born free and equal and have certain natural, essential and unalienable
rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and
liberties; that of acquiring, possessing and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and
obtaining their safety and happiness. Equality under the law shall not be denied or
abridged because of sex, race, color, creed or national origin.
Id.
128. Id. at 970-71 (Greaney, J., concurring).
129. Id. at 972-7 3 (Greaney, J., concurring).
130. Id. at 973 (Greaney, J., concurring).
131. Id. (Greaney, J., concurring).
132. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 974.
133. Id. at 974 (Spina, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 975 (Spina, J., dissenting).
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acterization of the fundamental right to marry as including same-sex un-
ions; 35 and 4) the revising of the statute to be gender neutral. 36 Justice
Sosman, on the other hand, feared that the court did not properly apply
the rationality standard of review.' 37 Finally, Justice Cordy shared Jus-
tice Spina's concerns regarding redefining marriage to include same-sex
unions, and deciding the same-sex marriage debate in court instead of
through the legislative process. 138 Justice Cordy also opined that there
was no fundamental right to privacy issue at stake.'3 9
1. Justice Spina's Dissent
Justice Spina expressed concerns that the majority overstepped its
judicial boundaries. 40 Simply put, the power to regulate marriage is held
by the legislature and, therefore, Justice Spina argued that the court was
usurping that power.14
1
According to Justice Spina, the Massachusetts statute does not dis-
criminate against any particular group but applies to all individuals
equally. 42 Justice Spina reasoned that the gender contemplated was the
gender of the person to whom the law applies, not the gender of that per-
son's partner. 143 Thus, the inability to marry a person of the same sex
applied equally to all persons under the law. 1  Additionally, Justice
Spina explained that the marriage statute did not discriminate based on
sexual orientation. 145 First, like a heterosexual person, a homosexual
person was free to enter into a permissible civil marriage with a person
of the opposite sex.' 46 Second, homosexual and heterosexual persons
were also equally denied the ability to marry a person of the same sex. 14 7
Despite the plaintiffs' equal protection argument, Justice Spina found
that G.L. c. 207 did not discriminate on the basis of gender.
48
Next, Justice Spina addressed the plaintiffs' due process argument.
Justice Spina reasoned that because same-sex marriage was not "deeply
rooted in the nation's history," it did not meet the test of a fundamental
right. 49 While Justice Spina conceded that people have a right to choose
whom to marry, he claimed that the choice had not traditionally involved
135. Id. at 976 (Spina, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 977 (Spina, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 978-79 (Sosman, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 984, 987 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 986 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 974 (Spina, J., dissenting).
141. Id. (Spina, J., dissenting).
142. Id. (Spina, J., dissenting).
143. Id. (Spina, J., dissenting).
144. Id. (Spina, ., dissenting).
145. Id. at 975 (Spina, J., dissenting).
146. Id. (Spina, J., dissenting).
147. Id. (Spina, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 974 (Spina, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 976 (Spina, J., dissenting).
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the right to choose a person of the same sex. 150  According to Justice
Spina, there was no constitutionally protected right, fundamental or oth-
erwise, at stake in this case and, therefore, the majority was wrong to
apply even a rational basis test. 151
Finally, Justice Spina reasoned that the majority's remedy of mak-
ing the statute gender neutral was outside the bounds of permissible judi-
cial discretion.152 The judiciary may only revise a legislative statute if
the legislative intent is preserved. 153 Thus, according to Justice Spina,
changing gender specific wording into gender neutral language violated
legislative intent.'
54
2. Justice Sosman's Dissent
Justice Sosman opined that the majority misused the rational basis
standard of review by holding it to too high of a threshold. 55 The ra-
tional basis standard of review requires that the statute "satisfies a mini-
mal threshold of rationality."' 5 6 Thus, the reasons given by the defen-
dants met this minimal threshold. In addition to her concerns about use
of the rational basis standard, Justice Sosman also was concerned that
there was no compelling reason for the court to force the state to give
same-sex couples the benefits singled out for opposite-sex couples.
157
According to Justice Sosman, there was insufficient evidence that same-
sex couples are essentially the same as opposite-sex couples. 58 In fact,
Justice Sosman noted that many opposite-sex couples with families are
not receiving the benefits of marriage. Hence, Justice Sosman concluded
that there was no compelling reason to single out same-sex couples to
receive benefits denied to all types of families without sufficient scien-
tific studies to back up the assertion.'
59
3. Justice Cordy's Dissent
Finally, Justice Cordy expressed concern with the majority's inter-
pretation of the definition of marriage, and believed this issue was better
left to the legislature. 160 In Justice Cordy's opinion, the majority im-
properly redefined marriage to include unions of same-sex partners so
that it could declare that the Massachusetts marriage license statute vio-
150. Id. (Spina, J., dissenting).
151. Id. (Spina, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 977 (Spina, J., dissenting).
153. Id. (Spina, J., dissenting).
154. Id. (Spina, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 978-79 (Sosman, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 978 (Sosman, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 978-79 (Sosman, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 979 (Sosman, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 981 (Sosman, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 984, 1004 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
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lated a fundamental right to marry. 16 1 Yet, according to Justice Cordy,
the fundamental right to marry has never included the right to marry a
person of the same sex.162 Justice Cordy argued that many of the cases
claiming that the right to marry was a fundamental right implicitly meant
that procreation with a chosen partner was a fundamental right. 163 There-
fore, Justice Cordy concluded that this case did not implicate the right to
privacy issue because the right to privacy only applies to sexual rela-
tions.164 In particular, G.L. c. 207 did not interfere with the ability to
have a homosexual relationship; it merely meant that the state did not
want to single out such relationships for these types of benefits.165 Fur-
thermore, Justice Cordy advised that the court should hesitate to make
decisions that might create a new fundamental right when public opinion
on same-sex marriage was unknown. 16 6 According to Justice Cordy, the
best way to determine public opinion is to leave it to the legislature to
decide the same-sex marriage issue.
167
The majority and dissenting opinions in Goodridge disagreed about
whether the case involved determining the constitutionality of a state
statute or deferring a political decision to the legislature. However, even
if the court agreed that the case was about the constitutionality of the
Massachusetts statute, the majority and dissent disagreed about how to
apply the rational basis standard of review to the statute. Because the
majority deemed the case to be a determination of the constitutionality of
a state statute, it was properly decided by the court and not by the legisla-
ture. However, the plaintiffs' wisdom in bringing the case rather than
pursuing legislative action was dubious in light of the backlash of consti-
tutional amendments that similar cases in other states had sparked.
IV. ANALYSIS
The Goodridge dissents' concern that the issue of same-sex mar-
riage should have been left to the legislature is well founded. Although
marriage is a civil institution, it also has deep religious and traditional
meanings to Americans that are inconsistent with the inclusion of same-
sex partnerships. Such an emotionally charged issue should be left to the
representatives of popular opinion to decide. This analysis will cover
several of the issues related to deciding this question in court instead of
through the legislative process. First, there is recent legislative and judi-
cial action indicating that Americans on the whole favor a definition of
marriage limited to unions between one man and one woman. Second,
161. Id. at 984 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
162. Id. (Cordy, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 985 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
164. Id. (Cordy, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 986-87 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 1004 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
167. Id. (Cordy, J., dissenting).
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the bans on same-sex marriage, anti-miscegenation laws, and sodomy are
not so analogous as to indicate a need for judicial action to override con-
stitutional violations. Third, polls of public opinion indicate a more fa-
vorable political environment for same-sex civil unions with marriage-
like benefits than for same-sex marriages. Finally, by resolving the issue
in court, Goodridge has resulted in pre-emptive strikes against same-sex
marriages in both state and federal forums that leave persons granted
same-sex marriages in Massachusetts in a tenuous legal position.
A. Legal Action Indicates Resistance to Same-Sex Marriage
Legal recognition of committed domestic relationships and equal
access to benefits regardless of sexual orientation undoubtedly is desir-
able. However, forcing recognition and access through a state supreme
court decision may not be the best route to achieving this goal. Without
the support of popular opinion, a state supreme court decision leaves the
door open for constitutional amendments that would definitively exclude
same-sex couples from ever having access to the institution of marriage.
In fact, a similar holding in the Supreme Court of Alaska led to exactly
that result.
68
Following the landmark decision in Baehr v. Lewin' 69 in 1993, the
Republican dominated Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act.
170
This act defined marriage at the federal level as being the union of one
man and one woman. 17  In addition, this legislation gave states permis-
sion to give no credit to same-sex marriages solemnized in other states.
172
President Clinton signed the bill into law in 1996.173 State legislatures
across the country followed suit and enacted state Defense of Marriage
Acts to: 1) define marriage as a union between one man and one woman;
and 2) express their intentions to hold as invalid any same-sex marriage
solemnized in other states.
17 4
Thirty-eight states have current statutes defining marriage as the un-
ion between one man and one woman. 175 In addition, in Minnesota, one
of the states without such a statute, the supreme court ruled in 1971 that
168. See Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743 at *4
(Alaska Feb. 27, 1998) (concluding marriage statute violated right to privacy provision in Alaska
Constitution; superseded by constitutional amendment, ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25).
169. 852 P.2d 44, 68 (Haw. 1993) (concluding marriage statute implicated Hawaii Constitu-
tion's equal protection clause; remanded case to lower court for further proceedings).
170. See Charles Bierbauer, Anti Gay Marriage Act Clears Congress, CNN.com, Sept. 10,
1996, at http://www.cnn.com/us/9609/10/gay.marriage.
171. See Louise Schiavone, Amendments Tie Up Anti Gay-Marriage Bill, CNN.com, Sept. 5,
1996, at http://www.cnn.com/us19609/05/gay.marriageslindex.html.
172. Schiavone, supra note 171.
173. Bierbauer, supra note 170.
174. See B.A. Robinson, Same Sex Marriages (SSM) and Civil Unions, REUGIOUS
TOLERANCE.ORG, at http://www.religioustolerance.org/hon_marr.htm (last updated March 8, 2005).
175. Robinson, supra note 174.
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same-sex marriage is not allowed under the statute and that the statute
does not deprive these couples of any fundamental right.
76
Cases similar to Goodridge and previous same-sex marriage dis-
putes have been unsuccessful in Arizona and the District of Columbia.
17
Of the four state supreme courts that have declared state statutes limiting
marriage to opposite-sex couples to be a violation of state constitutions,
only the decision in Massachusetts resulted in an order to grant marriage
licenses to same-sex couples. 178 Of the three remaining states, Alaska
and Hawaii passed amendments to the state constitutions defining mar-
riage as the union between one man and one woman. 179 These constitu-
tional amendments rendered the state statutes at issue in the cases consti-
tutionally valid. Finally, Vermont created a parallel institution to grant
state benefits and the responsibilities of marriage to same-sex couples
without giving them the status of being married.8 0
In 2004, courts in both New York and California decided cases
brought against public officials for solemnizing same-sex marriages in
violation of state statutes.'18  While the Justice Court of New York dis-
missed the charges, because the court determined the statute refusing
marriage licenses to same-sex couples violated equal protection laws,'
82
the case from California resulted in invalidation of all same-sex mar-
riages obtained in violation of the state statute.1
8 3
These court decisions, statutory enactments and proposed constitu-
tional amendments demonstrate a lack of cohesion across the United
States in opinions about same-sex marriage. However, the fact that to
date no state has enacted a law or constitutional amendment declaring
same-sex marriage legal is a clear indicator that public opinion does not
strongly support same-sex couples having the right to marriage. 184 In
fact, the myriad of Defense of Marriage Acts and amendments to state
constitutions specifically excluding same-sex couples from the definition
of marriage, demonstrate a greater tendency of Americans to vote against
marriage for same-sex couples when given the choice. 85 The plaintiffs
176. See Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186-87 (Minn. 1971).
177. See Standhardt v. Super. Ct. of Ariz., 77 P.3d 451, 465 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003); Dean v.
Dist. of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 361 (D.C. 1995) (per curiam).
178. See ALASKA CONST. art.1, § 25; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23; Brause, 1998 WL 88743 at *4
(Alaska Feb. 27, 1998) (concluding marriage statute violated right to privacy provision in Alaska
Constitution; superseded by constitutional amendment, ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25); Baehr v.
Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 68 (Haw. 1993) (concluding marriage statute implicated Hawaii Constitution's
equal protection clause; remanded case to lower court for further proceedings); Goodridge v. Dep't
of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969-70 (Mass. 2003); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 889 (Vt. 1999).
179. See ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 25; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23.
180. See Baker, 744 A.2d at 889.
181. See Lockyer v. City and County of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459, 464 (Cal. 2004); People v.
West, 780 N.Y.S.2d 723, 723-24 (N.Y. Jus. Ct. 2004).
182. West, 780 N.Y.S.2d at 725.
183. Lockyer, 95 P.3d at 499.
184. See generally Robinson, supra note 174.
185. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 25; HAw. CONST. art. I, § 23.
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in Goodridge obviously were undeterred by the negative history evi-
denced by the other similar same-sex marriage cases.
The plaintiffs in Goodridge may have sought access to civil mar-
riage through the court system because the United States has a history of
promoting important social change by engaging the judicial branch.
186
Arguably, the civil rights movement of the 1960s was spurred by the
Supreme Court's opinion in Brown v. Board of Education.187 In Brown,
the Court recognized the social stigma and psychic harm caused by seg-
regating school children. 88 A backlash of resistance to desegregation
followed the Brown decision, just as a backlash of resistance to inclusion
of same-sex unions in the definition of marriage followed Goodridge and
similar cases. 189 Supporters of seeking access to civil marriage for same-
sex couples through the judicial system may see the eventual acceptance
of desegregation and success of the civil rights movement as indicators
that long-term social change will result from decisions like Goodridge.
However, there is an argument that Brown was not the start of the civil
rights movement, just a step in a process already in motion.19° In fact,
there may have already been a social, economic, and political climate
that would have eventually led to the Civil Rights Act in the absence of
Brown.191 Some argue that Brown's major contribution to the civil rights
movement was motivating opponents of desegregation to violence.
92
This display of violence may have sparked otherwise unmotivated sup-
porters to take action.1
93
So far, Goodridge and similar cases have not sparked violence by
opponents, just constitutional amendments precluding the possibility of
long-term access to civil marriage for same-sex couples. 194 The continu-
ing success of these state constitutional amendments defining marriage
as the union between one man and one woman shows that the present
social, economic and political climate of the United States does not sup-
port a social change in favor of civil marriage for same-sex couples.
186. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 164-65 (1973).
187. See Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA.
L. REv. 7, 13 (1994) (citing EARL BLACK, SOUTHERN GOVERNORS AND CIVIL RIGHTS: RACIAL
SEGREGATION AS A CAMPAIGN ISSUE IN THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 109 (1976)).
188. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95.
189. Compare Klarman supra note 187, at 11 with Kavan Peterson, 50-state rundown on gay
marriage laws, Stateline.org (last updated Nov. 3, 2004), at http://www.stateline.org/stateline/
?pa=story&sa=showStorylnfo&id=353058.
190. See Klarinan, supra note 187, at 80-85.
191. See Klarman, supra note 187, at 71-76.
192. Klarman, supra note 187, at 76.
193. Klarman, supra note 187, at 11.
194. See Peterson, supra note 189.
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B. Goodridge not analogous to Lawrence v. Texas, 195 Perez v. Sharp,196
and Loving v. Virginia
t97
Despite the emergence of state constitutional amendments against
same-sex marriage, the recent Supreme Court decision in Lawrence v.
Texas 198 might be construed as an indicator of a favorable political cli-
mate for change in the treatment of homosexual couples. 99 Yet, Law-
rence dealt strictly with the right to privacy and freedom from govern-
mental intrusion into the private sexual conduct of its citizens. 200 Law-
rence did not deal with state-conferred benefits for couples engaged in
those private relationships. 20 1 While the Lawrence decision took the
government officially out of the role of actively prosecuting private inti-
mate associations, the ruling did not mandate that legislatures provide
statutory support for homosexuality. 2
At issue in Lawrence was a Texas criminal statute used to prosecute
adult homosexuals engaged in private consensual acts.2°3  At issue in
Goodridge was a civil code used to confer on heterosexual couples a
public status and to give them certain state benefits. 0° Criminalizing the
private conduct of a class of citizens is different from offering a package
of benefits to go along with a civilly conferred status. Moreover, deny-
ing same-sex couples access to civil marriage does not attach the same
stigma to homosexuals as having a criminal record for engaging in their
private intimate relationships. Additionally, unlike Lawrence, the state
did not rationalize offering civil marriage only to opposite-sex couples
by condemning the morality of same-sex relationships.2 5  Instead, the
state argued that the statute furthered legitimate government interests in
procreation, guaranteed optimal child-rearing settings, and safeguarded
state and private resources.
206
Finally, there has been no similar movement in the United States to
criticize or refuse to adhere to civil marriage statutes. Although, there
have been a few isolated legal cases, and some disobedience of control-
ling civil marriage laws, there has not been a pattern of not enforcing the
limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples. 07 In fact, the few court
195. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
196. 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948).
197. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
198. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79.
199. See id. at 599-602 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
200. See id. at 578.
201. See id.
202. Id. at 578-79.
203. Id. at 563.
204. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 950-51.
205. See id. at 961.
206. Id.
207. See, e.g., Brause, 1998 WL 88743 at *4-*6 (concluding marriage statute violated right to
privacy provision in Alaska Constitution; superseded by constitutional amendment, article I, section
25 of the Constitution of Alaska); Lockyer, 95 P.3d at 498; Baehr, 852 P.2d at 57-58 (concluding
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decisions and acts of disobedience have mostly been met with backlash
and, thus, reaffirm the disapproval of same-sex marriage. °8
Because Lawrence decided only the constitutionality of prohibiting
private sexual conduct by criminalizing it, and not promoting certain
civil relationships for legitimate government purposes, the decision does
not support the idea that civil marriage laws violate due process and
equal protection.2 9 As a result, the Massachusetts Supreme Court's de-
cision to recognize same-sex marriage may do more harm than good for
homosexuals in the United States. While Lawrence may have seemed
like an invitation by the Supreme Court to challenge the constitutionality
of denying same-sex couples access to marriage, the Court limited its
holding to criminalized private sexual conduct.2 10 Thus, state laws ban-
ning same-sex marriage are easily differentiated from those criminalizing
private adult consensual homosexual acts.
Moreover, unlike the couples in Perez v. Sharp211 and Loving v.
Virginia, 2 2 same-sex couples do enjoy a host of benefits similar to those
213enjoyed by married couples. Plaintiffs questioning the constitutional-
ity of denying same-sex couples the right to civil marriage tend to rely on
the reasoning of these two cases that struck down anti-miscegenation
laws. 214 Under the respective provisions of the statutes in Perez and Lov-
ing, mixed-race couples could not get married. z 5 In fact, prior to the
1980s, no private or governmental entities in the United States conferred
benefits on domestic partners. 216 Thus, without recognition of their civil
marriages, these mixed-race couples had no protective legal relationship
available to them.217 While same-sex couples do not qualify for civil
marriage in the majority of states, they do qualify for many domestic
218partner benefits similar to those offered to married couples. Overall,
the political standing of same-sex couples in the United States today is
marriage statute implicated Hawaii Constitution's equal protection clause; remanded case to lower
court for further proceedings); Baker, 744 A.2d at 886; but cf. Dean, 653 A.2d at 361; West, 780
N.Y.S. 2d at 725.
208. See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 189.
209. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
210. See id.
211. 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948).
212. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
213. Mikaila Mariel Lemonik Arthur, An Encyclopedia of Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, Trans-
gender, and Queer Culture: Domestic Partnerships (Feb. 28, 2004), at www.glbtq.com/social-
sciences/domestic-partnerships.html (last visited January 17, 2005).
214. See, e.g., Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 458; Baehr, 852 P.2d at 61-63 (concluding marriage
statute implicated Hawaii Constitution's equal protection clause; remanded case to lower court for
further proceedings); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 957-58.
215. Loving, 388 U.S. at 6; Perez, 198 P.2d at 18.
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not as perilous as the standing of mixed-race couples facing anti-
miscegenation laws prior to recognition of domestic partner benefits.2 19
C. Reactions to Goodridge
1. Popular Opinion
At this time, there are no clear indicators that popular opinion in
Massachusetts supports access to civil marriage for same-sex couples.
Specifically, popular opinion polls on same-sex marriage indicated that
Massachusetts's voters are divided on the issue. A poll taken in Massa-
chusetts following the Goodridge decision indicates that popular opinion
did support the court's ruling to legalize same-sex marriages.22 The poll
results showed that 50 percent of the 400 persons asked supported the
court's decision, while only 38 percent opposed it.221 When polled about
support for an amendment to the state constitution defining marriage to
exclude same-sex couples, 53 percent opposed passing an amendment
and only 36 percent supported it.222 While these results seem to indicate
the support of popular opinion for the social change sought by the ?lain-
tiffs, another poll taken in Massachusetts produced different results.
According to a poll conducted by RKM Research and Communica-
tions, 76 percent of Massachusetts voters believed that same-sex couples
should have access to the same marital benefits afforded to opposite sex
couples.224 However, only 49 percent of the polled individuals suported
calling the system of benefits for same-sex couples "marriage."2 The
results of this poll indicate that the political and social climate of the
state may be ready for civil unions but not for same-sex civil marriage.2 26
Recent legislative decisions in other states indicate that civil unions
have more popular support than do civil marriages for same-sex cou-
ples.227 When the Vermont legislature decided to enact a parallel system
of civil unions in place of same-sex civil marriage, the Vermont legisla-
ture explained: "Granting benefits and protections to same-sex couples
219. Id.
220. Frank Phillips & Rick Klein, Fifty Percent in Poll Back SJC Ruling on Gay Marriage,
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 23, 2003, available at http://www.glad.org/marriage/globe+herald-polls 11-
23-03.shtml (taken for Boston Globe and WBZ-TV).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. David R. Guarino, Same-Sex Benefits Get Voters' Blessings: Most OK Gay Marriage,





227. See An Act Relating to Civil Unions, Pub. Act No. 91, § 1(10), 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves
(2000), available at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/2000/acts/actO91.htm (last visited March 8,
2005); David Orgon Coolidge, Same-Sex Marriage: As Hawaii Goes... 72 FIRST THINGS 33, 33-
37 (1997), available at http://www.firstthings.com/ftissues/ft9704/articles/coolidge.html.
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through a system of civil unions will provide due respect for tradition
and long-standing social institutions, and will permit adjustment as unan-
ticipated consequences or unmet needs arise., 228  The civil union ap-
proach was also palatable to Hawaiians following the state supreme
court's ruling in Baehr.229 The amendment to Hawaii's constitution de-
fining marriage as a union between one man and one woman did not pass
until there also was a bill proposing a civil union system of benefits for
same-sex couples.23°
In an effort to recognize civil unions, an amendment excluding
same-sex couples from getting married and instead creating a Vermont-
style civil union system has already passed the first round of approval in
the Massachusetts legislature. 23' If the amendment gets re-approved in
2005, Massachusetts's voters could decide the issue in 2006.2 32 if this
amendment becomes part of the state constitution, it is unclear what
status same-sex couples married between May 17, 2004 and 2006 will
have.233 Therefore, without a clear majority in favor of the decision in
Goodridge, same-sex couples are getting married in Massachusetts ab-
sent guarantees that their marriages will be valid two years from now.
234
Despite the Massachusetts legislature's movement toward a civil
union system, the Goodridge court opined that civil unions were not
enough to satisfy the constitutional issues.235  According to the court,
only full scale civil marriage for same-sex couples would suffice.2 36 Be-
cause the Goodridge court refused to substitute civil unions for civil mar-
riage, same-sex couples in Massachusetts may only receive state-
conferred marital benefits through an institution not clearly supported by
public opinion. As a result, same-sex married couples in Massachusetts
are in a tenuous position that they would not have been in had they
sought change through legislation and not through the court system.
2. Interstate Effects
Furthermore, the Goodridge decision put other states on alert about
the constitutionality of Defense of Marriage Act laws. States have re-
acted by enacting pre-emptive state constitutional amendments preclud-
ing the possibility of widespread recognition of same-sex marriages in
the United States. An opinion poll conducted with a national sample
228. Act Relating to Civil Unions, supra note 227, at § 1(10).
229. See Coolidge, supra note 227.
230. Id.
231. See Peterson, supra note 189.
232. Id.
233. Theo Emery, Same-Sex Couples Marry in Massachusetts, GrandForksHerald.com, May
17, 2004, at http://www.grandforks.com/mld/grandforks/8682758.htm (last visited March 8, 2005).
234. See id.
235. See In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 569 (Mass. 2004) (court
responding to legislature's question about whether civil unions would suffice).
236. Id. at 571-72.
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showed a similar tendency to favor civil unions over civil marriage for
same-sex couples. 237 While 56 percent of people oppose or strongly op-
pose civil marriage for same-sex couples, only 32 percent favor or
strongly favor civil marriage.2 38 Only 43 percent of those polled oppose
or strongly oppose a system of civil unions and 49 percent favor or
strongly favor civil unions.239 Winning recognition of same-sex marriage
in one state does not result in federal marriage benefits for these couples,
nor does it guarantee recognition of the marriage in any other state.
24°
Forcing legal recognition of marriages between persons not fitting the
traditional definition of a married couple in one state puts other states on
alert to take pre-emptive measures to exclude these marriages from rec-
ognition in their borders. 1  Ultimately, this will impede the mobility of
same-sex married couples, because moving outside the State of Massa-
chusetts could mean losing marriage benefits.2 42
In response to Goodridge, Governor Romney of Massachusetts has
revived a turn-of-the-century miscegenation law preventing couples that
are not legally eligible to marry in their own states from getting married
in Massachusetts.2 43 The majority of states already have Defense of Mar-
riage Acts in their statutory schemes.2 4 A number of these statutes make
clear that states that have banned same-sex marriage will not recognize
same-sex marriages formed in states like Massachusetts.24' The Federal
Defense of Marriage Act of 1996 granted these states the power to ignore
same-sex civil marriages formed outside the state, despite the Constitu-
tion's requirement of states to give full faith and credit to contracts
formed in other states.2 6 The Federal Defense of Marriage Act led to a
body of law across the country largely unwelcoming to married same-sex
couples. 247  Therefore, in addition to having a tenuous future status in
237. See Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, Pew Forum on Religion & Public




240. Arthur, supra note 213.
241. See Peterson, supra note 189.
242. id.
243. See, e.g., Scott S. Greenberger, Reilly Says Curb on Gay Marriage Blunts Backlash,
BOSTON GLOBE, July 13, 2004, available at http://www.equalmarriage.org/press.php.
244. See Peterson, supra note 189 (for example, CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (West 2004) states
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Massachusetts, same-sex married couples also risk losing recognition of
their union should they decide to move to a different state.
3. Constitutional Amendments
Various states are already taking pre-emptive action against future
248cases like Goodridge by amending their constitutions. In November
2004, the public in eleven states voted for constitutional amendments
restricting the definition of marriage to apply only to opposite-sex cou-
ples. 249 Additionally, the voters in Missouri passed such an amendment
to the state constitution in early August 2004.250
The ruling in Goodridge sparked a pre-emptive reaction from the
251federal government. ' Senator Wayne Allard of Colorado introduced a
federal marriage amendment that would ban same-sex marriages but
leave room for civil unions.52 The proposal was the third attempt to pass
such an amendment since 2002 and was defeated on July 14, 2004.253
An ABC News/Washington Post survey of public opinion across the
United States about same-sex marriage indicated that more Americans
oppose same-sex marriage than support it.254  However, the poll also
showed that most people also oppose a pre-emptive federal constitutional
amendment to settle the issue.
2 55
4. Colorado
Colorado has a history of rejecting the legislative protection of ho-
mosexuals. In the early 1990s, Colorado voters passed an amendment to
the state constitution that prohibited state and local governments from
enacting any measure to protect homosexuals from discrimination.256
The Supreme Court struck down the Amendment because it persecuted a
specifically targeted group of people and had no rational state interest. 57
Despite this landmark decision, Colorado continues to stifle homosexu-
als' rights. For instance, Colorado has a statute defining marriage as the
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249. Peterson, supra note 189 (the eleven states are: Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan,
Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon and Utah).
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WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Aug. 5, 2004, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A38861-2004Aug4.html.
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union between one man and one woman.258  Moreover, a private non-
partisan polling company reported that as of 2003, 56 percent of Colora-
doans opposed the legalization of same-sex marriages.2 59 While represen-
tatives and senators from Colorado have been instrumental in introducing
federal marriage amendments to Congress, there was no such amendment
on the ballot in Colorado for November 2004.26
Because same-sex couples do enjoy a variety of marriage-like bene-
fits in most states, they can afford to bide their time and wait for a favor-
able political climate to seek recognition of their right to marry through
the legislative process. In the end, the backing of the legislature and
popular opinion would more likely result in long-term widespread accep-
tance of same-sex marriages in the United States.
CONCLUSION
Over the last ten years, same-sex couples have launched cases
around the country challenging the constitutionality of denying them
access to civil marriage. 261 In most states, same-sex couples certainly do
not receive benefits under the law equal to those of opposite-sex married
couples. 262 However, the goal of equality is not best met through state
supreme court decisions in the absence of a socially, politically and eco-
nomically favorable climate.263
Before the court decided Goodridge, there was already a trend of
victory for same-sex marriage in state court followed by a rush to amend
the state constitution, or otherwise permissibly exclude same-sex couples
from civil marriage. 264 Not only have these cases inspired voters in the
affected states to enact restrictive legislation, but the outcome of the
cases has also prompted other states to take pre-emptive legislative ac-
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implicated Hawaii Constitution's equal protection clause; remanded case to lower court for further
proceedings); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 889 (Vt. 1999) (concluding marriage statute violated
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465 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (marriage statute does not violate liberty interests under either Federal or
Arizona Constitution).
262. Robinson, supra note 174.
263. See Klarman, supra note 187.
264. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25 (2003); HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23 (2003); Brause, 1998
WL 88743, at *4-5 (concluding marriage statute violated right to privacy provision in Alaska Con-
stitution) (superseded by constitutional amendment, art. I, § 25 of the Constitution of Alaska);
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tion against same-sex marriage. 2 65 Despite this backdrop, same-sex cou-
ples brought their action to court instead of using the legislative proc-
ess.266
Although the Massachusetts Constitution is open to the interpreta-
tion that the right to choice of marital partner, regardless of gender, is
protected, 267 because judges are not elected officials, their decisions to
recognize same-sex rights to marry do not necessarily reflect public opin-
ion. Because of the resulting backlash of constitutional amendments that
foreclose the possibility of long-term equality for homosexuals,268 same-
sex couples married in Massachusetts are now in limbo, waiting to see if
their state will pass an amendment to the constitution invalidating their
unions.269 In the case of same-sex marriage, bad timing and choice of
forum may have stunted rather than promoted social change.
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